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Abstract 
 
The preliminary reference procedure has been  crucial in the legal integration of the 
Europe Union. The procedure allows the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to involve 
national courts in the application and enforcement of European law. In this paper we 
analyze why the ECJ receives more requests for a preliminary reference from some 
member states than from others. While this is not a new question, only a few systematic 
comparative tests have been presented to date, and these display important theoretical 
and  methodological  shortcomings.  Theoretically,  previous  studies  underestimate  or 
neglect two intuitively plausible factors: country size and litigation rates. We argue that 
courts in bigger and highly judicialized countries send more references to Luxembourg. 
Methodologically, the quantitative design of existing comparative studies give a first 
indication  of possible  causal  relationships, but  several  of  the  cases  remain  not  well 
explained.  We argue that country comparison is improved by analyzing necessary and 
sufficient conditions that highlight the particular combination of factors for each case.  
We apply a mixed quantitative and qualitative comparative analysis and test existing 
and new explanations for variation in the number of preliminary references from the 
fifteen old EU member states in the period from 1995 to 2006.     3 
1. Preliminary references: the puzzle 
 
The significance of the preliminary reference procedure in transforming national courts 
into European courts, and more generally, in the legal integration of Europe, can hardly 
be overestimated.
1 Most of the landmark judgments by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ),  situated  in  Luxembourg,  were  handed  after  a  national  court  requested  the 
Luxembourg judges, pending a national case, to give a judgment on the interpretation of 
European law in a preliminary ruling.
2 The preliminary reference procedure provides 
that domestic courts in EU member states can, and in some cases must, refer questions 
on the interpretation or the validity of European law to the ECJ in Luxembourg.
3 The 
division of labor between the national courts and the ECJ is such that the national court 
establishes the facts and applies the law to those facts, while the ECJ restricts itself to 
interpreting European law or to ruling on the validity of secondary European law. It ‘is 
a fundamental mechanism of European Union law aimed at enabling national courts to 
ensure uniform interpretation and application of that law in all the Member States’.
4  
 
The  preliminary  reference  procedure  thus  provides  an  avenue  for  direct  inter-court 
communication between national courts and the European Court of Justice. Article 234 
of the EC Treaty, which defines the preliminary reference procedure, allows for ‘the 
clock to be stopped’: it gives the national courts the possibility to seek help from the 
ECJ  in  the  interpretation  and  construction  of  EU  law  and  it  gives  the  ECJ  the 
opportunity to intervene while the case is still pending before a national court. This 
interconnection  between  international  and  national  courts  is  unique  and  is 
                                                 
1 See Weiler 1995; Alter 1998, 2000, 2009; Claes 2006. 
2 See Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1962] ECR 1;  Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585.  
3 The general provision providing for preliminary references is Art. 234 EC Treaty. The special procedure 
for preliminary references in Title IV of the EC Treaty is laid down in Art.  68 EC and restricts references 
to courts deciding in final instance. In the context of the third pillar, Art. 35 EU provides for a special 
preliminary reference procedure. In contrast to Art. 234 EC and Art. 68 EC the ECJ has jurisdiction only 
in so far as the member state has accepted it in a declaration, specifying whether it opts for a system 
where all courts can make references or only courts against whose decision there is no appeal. Seventeen 
member states have accepted jurisdiction of the ECJ under Art. 35 EU, three have denied it  (Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK) and seven member states have made no declaration at all.  The data are available on 
the ECJ’s website, see http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/txtdocfr/txtsenvigueur/art35.pdf.  
4 Information Note on references from national courts for a preliminary ruling, 2005, 1.   4 
fundamentally  different  than  appeals  procedures  that  exist  in  other  international 
organizations, such as the Council of Europe, where the European Court of Human 
Rights cannot directly interfere in a case: a case can only be brought before it  once all 
local remedies have been exhausted and the domestic highest court has decided a case.  
 
The system depends on the cooperation of the national courts and their willingness to 
refer. Parties do not have a right to a reference: it is ultimately for the court to decide. 
There are two kinds of references: questions of interpretation of European law, and 
questions concerning the validity of secondary European law.  Any court or tribunal 
may refer a question to the Court on the interpretation of a rule of European law if it 
considers it necessary to do so in order to resolve a dispute brought before it. However, 
courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national 
law must, as a rule, refer such a question to the Court, unless the Court has already ruled 
on the point (known as ‘acte éclairé’), or unless the correct interpretation of the rule of 
Community law is obvious and would be the same for any court across the EU and for 
each of the language versions of the relevant provision (known as ‘acte clair’). When it 
comes to questions of validity, all national courts must refer a question to the Court 
when they have doubts about the validity of a European act, stating the reasons for 
which they consider that the Community act may be invalid. For reasons of uniformity, 
national courts are precluded from holding European law invalid or inapplicable.  
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
The preliminary reference procedure is generally hailed as the ‘jewel in the Crown’ of 
the ECJ jurisdiction.
5 Figure 1 shows the overall increase of the use of the preliminary 
reference procedure, from around a dozen cases per year on average during the 1960s to 
more than two hundred cases per year since the early 1990s. It is important, by the way, 
to notice that these numbers refer to cases where domestic courts actually make use of 
the preliminary  reference procedure, but that this says nothing about the number of 
cases where courts could or should have done so and have not, or about the number of 
cases decided by these courts which involve issues of European law. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Craig and de Búrca (2008), 460.   5 
When we look at the use of the preliminary reference procedure across member states, 
we find a wide variance. Whereas some member states refer only one or two cases 
annually on average to the ECJ others refer up to a few dozen cases. Figure 2 presents a 
box-plot of the number of preliminary references per year for the fifteen ‘old’ member 
states in the period from 1995 to 2006. The figure shows three groups of countries: a 
‘top’ group of Germany and Italy with a median above forty references per year; a 
middle  group  of  Austria,  Belgium,  France,  Netherlands  and  the  UK  with  a  median 
around twenty; and a rest group of eight countries with a median below ten. The figure 
also shows that the use of arithmetic averages may give a misleading picture, as in the 
case of Spain where the 55 references in 1998 are a clear outlier. In Austria we see a 
steep increase after the first two years of EU membership, up to 57 references in 2001, 
followed by a strong decrease to maximum 15 references in the last fours years.
6  
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
What explains this variation? While this is not a new question, only a few systematic 
comparative tests have been presented to date, and these display important theoretical 
and  methodological  shortcomings.
7  Theoretically,  previous  studies  underestimate  or 
neglect two intuitively plausible factors: country size and litigation rates. We argue that 
courts in bigger and highly judicialized countries send more references to Luxembourg. 
In section 2 we  give an overview of the main  explanations that have been brought 
forward in the literature and also present the two new factors which we believe are 
better  predictors  of  cross-national  reference  patterns.  We  argue  that  the  country 
comparison is improved by analyzing necessary and sufficient conditions that highlight 
the particular combination of factors for each case. The empirical part  of the paper 
evaluates existing and new explanations for fifteen EU member states for the period 
1995 to 2006. We test these explanations in a mixed-method design, where we first run 
a multivariate regression analysis for the cross-section data set. This we do to compare 
our  findings  with  those  of  previous  studies.  Subsequently  we  run  a  second,  more 
qualitative comparative analysis, where we search for necessary and sufficient factors, 
or combinations of factors. We conclude the paper with a reflection on the added value 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 1 for an overview of the number of references between 1995 and 2006 for the fifteen 
member states that we analyze in this paper. 
7 See Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998; Carrubba and Murrah 2005.   6 
of a mixed-method design and also with a more general reflection on the use of the 
preliminary reference procedure. 
 
 
2. Explaining variation 
 
What explains the cross-country variation in the use of the Article 234 procedure? Why 
are courts in some states referring more questions to the ECJ than in other states?  
 
Before going to the existing explanations we make three preliminary remarks about the 
question why national judges would refer a question to Luxemburg, or why not. First, a 
judge making a reference may have different purposes in mind. She may simply inquire 
about the correct interpretation of a provision of European law or question its validity; 
she may even second-guess the ECJ’s previous case law, or ask the ECJ for further 
clarifications.  References  can  be  made  in  various  types  of  procedures:  between  an 
individual and a public authority (mainly in administrative law cases, and also criminal 
cases), between public authorities among themselves or between private parties (civil 
cases). European law may be invoked as a sword or as a shield.  
 
Second, even though the preliminary reference procedure can be seen as a decentralized 
compliance mechanism, to the extent that the procedure leads to the enforcement of 
European law and the sanctioning of incorrect application of European law by national 
authorities, a referring judge may not necessarily aim to achieve compliance.
8 Domestic 
courts use this form of judicial dialogue to solve questions of interpretation and these 
questions may not necessarily be related to enforcing European law vis-à-vis states. 
Low reference rates, for example in Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden, may imply that courts do not need the assistance of the ECJ to interpret 
EU law. This is not necessarily a sign of non-compliance or defiance. On the contrary, it 
is more and more agreed that national courts should assume responsibility as European 
courts: in a mature system, not all interpretation issues should be dealt with by the ECJ. 
Vice versa, high reference rates do not necessarily prove high compliance rates, nor 
does it prove that the courts perform their duties as European judges well. Frequent 
                                                 
8 Tallberg 2003, pp. 620-623; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998, pp. 67.    7 
referencing  may,  on  the  contrary,  mean  that  the  national  courts  do  not  take  full 
responsibility and refer any question of European law, even those which they may (and 
should) answer themselves. What counts is that the right questions are asked, at the 
right time, with the right purpose in mind. This may be illustrated by the Italian case 
where only 42% of all questions referred to Luxembourg ended in a judgment by the 
ECJ. This is well below the average 61% for all EU members in the period 1961-2006.
9 
 
In addition, what matters is what the courts do with the judgment of the ECJ on a 
reference, and whether they duly take it into account when handing the final decision in 
the case, in other words the ‘application’ of EU law to the facts of the case. It is difficult 
to get the complete picture of compliance by national courts with the ECJ judgments on 
preliminary references. As explained above, the ECJ only rules on the interpretation of 
EU law, while it remains the task of the national courts to solve the dispute before them. 
The ECJ invites the national courts making a reference to be informed on the action 
taken upon its ruling in the national proceedings and, where appropriate, a copy of the 
national court's final decision.
10  
 
Thirdly, the backlog and case overload in turn put the quality of the judicial work at 
risk, as well as the consistency of the ECJ’s case law. As a consequence, national courts 
may well have good reasons not to make a reference, in cases where they could (or 
                                                 
9 See Stone Sweet and Brunell 2007. From the 777 Italian cases in this database 11 were ended by a Court 
order and deemed inadmissible, while 180 cases were removed from the register, which usually happens 
when the Court’s registry advices that questions have been answered already in other cases. 
10  The  Association  of  Councils  of  State  and  Supreme  Administrative  Jurisdictions  began  in  2003  to 
publish these decisions in two databases, one on the basis of data collected by the participating national 
courts  (Jurifast)  and  one  on  the  basis  of  information  supplied  by  the  ECJ  (dec.nat.).  The  latter  is  a 
reference  database,  providing  the  dates  of  decisions,  the  courts  which  took  them,  details  of  their 
publication (if applicable), reviews and reports pertaining to them, and so forth. However, the database 
does not provide direct access to the documents themselves, which will have to be sought or obtained 
elsewhere.  See  http://curia.europa.eu/en/coopju/apercu_reflets/lang/index.htm.  Jurifast  does  contain 
summaries  of  decisions.  The  special  feature  of  this  system  is  that  members  enter  full  details  of  the 
decision on the site, together with a brief description of the subject and any references to the provisions of 
Community law concerned. They then submit a summary of the decision in either French or English, with 
a link to the full text of the decision in the original language.   8 
must!) do so.
11 This does not always have to do with insurgence on the part of those 
courts or bad faith. In some cases, courts and the parties before them prefer closure of 
the  case  over  the  certainty  that  an  issue  of  European  law  is  correctly  decided.
12 
Domestic courts may also have had a bad experience with a previous reference, where 
the ECJ’s answer was not very helpful. A hesitation to send a reference to Luxembourg 
may also have to do with built-up experience and confidence in applying European law. 
In  a  mature  decentralized  judicial  system,  not  all  cases  involving  a  European  law 
element should end up at the ECJ, and the national courts can take responsibility to 
perform their function as European courts. This does, however, require knowledge and 
expertise in European law, sensitivity to the characteristics of European law and the 
manner  in  which  it  has  been  developed  by  the  ECJ,  and  the  ability  to  take  on  a 
European perspective reaching beyond the national legal order. In other words, neither 
the ‘compliance’ of national courts with their European mandate, nor the compliance of 
states with EU law more generally, should be measured solely against the number of 
preliminary references being made. Acting as a European court equally requires the 
responsibility to answer some questions on their own, without requesting the assistance 
of the ECJ for each and every problem of interpretation.
13 Indeed, the fact that the ECJ 
has the final say on the interpretation of EU law, does not imply that national courts 
should not have any role in the interpretation and construction of EU law.  
 
Now that we have clarified more specifically the use of the preliminary procedure in 
general,  the  question  remains  what  explains  variation  in  the  use  of  this  procedure 
between  countries.  The  puzzle  discussed  in  this  paper  is  far  from  new.  Yet  the 
comparative literature presents a mixed picture with sometimes contrasting arguments 
and contrasting findings (see Table 1). We group these different kinds of explanations 
in two sets of hypotheses: a group of institutionalist hypotheses that focuses on the 
                                                 
11 A distinction must be made here between lower courts, and those whose decision there is no judicial 
remedy available. While the former may make a reference, the latter must request a preliminary ruling if a 
provision of European law is unclear and is necessary to solve the case before them. There are exceptions, 
though, generally referred to as the Cilfit criteria: where the interpretation is clear beyond all doubts, or 
where the correct interpretation transpires from previous case law, these courts too are absolved from 
their duty to refer a question to the ECJ. 
12 Nyikos 2007. 
13 See the famous plea for restraint of the part of national courts (and the ECJ) by Advocate general 
Jacobs in Case C-338/95 Wiener [1997] ECR I-6495, also known as the pyjamas case.   9 
domestic  legal  framework  (legal  doctrine  and  judicial  review)  and  a  group  of 
functionalist explanations focuses on societal factors (importance of intra-EU trade and 
support for integration). 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
Some scholars have pointed particularly to the importance of whether a country has a 
monist or dualist legal culture and also at whether judicial review is accepted or not.
14 
The traditional legal doctrine hypothesis states that more references will be made from 
monist countries than from dualist countries.
15 Under this hypothesis courts in monist 
countries,  where  there  is  a  less  strict  separation  between  the  domestic  and  the 
international legal order, and where it is not uncommon for courts to make use of non-
national sources of law, find it easier to also accept the interference of a European court 
in a domestic case. Thus, it is not a coincidence that thirteen out of the first fifteen 
references  made,  came  from  Dutch  courts.  Of  the  six  original  member  states,  the 
Netherlands’  legal  order  was  most  monist,  and  the  power  of  the  courts  to  apply 
international treaties and set aside conflicting national legislation had been incorporated 
in the Constitution in 1953. It has been demonstrated that the Dutch courts had not 
made use of the power to set aside domestic primary law for violation of international 
treaty provisions prior to Van Gend en Loos. In fact, the Dutch courts were probably 
pleased with the assistance from an international court in deciding whether a particular 
provision was one that could actually be applied.
16 Vice versa, so the explanation goes, 
courts in dualist states will prefer not to engage in a dialogue with a non-national courts, 
since  they  are  not  prepared  to  apply  European  law  anyway.  Thus,  the  Italian 
government  intervening  in  Costa  v  ENEL  argued  that  the  ECJ  should  hold  the 
preliminary  reference  inadmissible,  since  the  judgment  could  not  be  of  avail  to  the 
Italian judge, who in any case had to give effect to the Italian law, whether consistent 
with Community law or not.
17  
 
                                                 
14 Alter 1996; Mattli and Slaughter 1998.  
15 Carrubba and Murrah 2005, p. 404.  
16 Claes and De Witte 1998.  
17 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.    10 
The  argument  could  however  also  go  in  the  opposite  direction:  courts  in  monist 
countries  would  rather  be  less  inclined  to  make  references,  since  they  already  are 
experienced in interpreting and applying non-national law and do not need assistance. It 
must  be  remembered  that  national  courts  (and  especially  the  lower  ones)  are  not 
precluded  from  interpreting  European  law  themselves.  Vice  versa,  courts  in  dualist 
states  which  never  apply  international  treaty  provisions  directly  and  are  suddenly 
obliged to do so under their European mandate, may be more inclined to seek help from 
the ECJ since they have no experience with the interpretation and application of law 
beyond the state. This may be termed a reversed legal doctrine hypothesis: monist states 
on average should make fewer references than dualist states.
18 
 
The judicial review hypothesis states that countries that already have a form of judicial 
review  within  their  national  system  are  more  likely  to  accept  the  consequences  of 
judicial review inherent in the preliminary reference procedure. The argument runs as 
follows: For a court to accept to make a reference, it must also accept the power to 
declare national law which appears –after the preliminary ruling- to be inconsistent with 
European law null and void, or at least, to set it aside. It must, in other words, act as a 
review court. This is most problematic when the origin of the  inconsistency is to be 
found in primary legislation, because in all member states, judicial review of primary 
legislation is either endowed to a specialized (constitutional) court, or it is prohibited. 
The  judicial  review  hypothesis  claims  that  in  countries  without  a  form  of  judicial 
review, the courts will make less references, and courts familiar with judicial review 
will send more questions, since the preliminary reference procedure and the power to 
review inconsistent national law that go with it, are considered a natural extension of 
preexisting powers.  
 
Yet, in this case also, there may be alternative expectations: courts in member states 
without  a  tradition  of judicial  review, but  willing  to  assume  the  mandate  to  review 
powers in the light of European law, may make references in order to join forces with 
an international court, which may give them confidence to conduct such novel review. 
This may be termed the reversed judicial review hypothesis.  
 
                                                 
18 See Carrubba and Murrah 2005, p. 405, who focus on litigant behavior in support of this hypothesis.    11 
The main problem with the judicial review hypothesis, formulated either way, is that it 
does  not  sufficiently  distinguish  between  the  specific  courts  and  their  role  in  the 
domestic  systems.  Carrubba  and  Murrah  rightfully  point  at  the  need  to  distinguish 
between abstract and concrete judicial review.
19 Abstract judicial review relates to the 
review of laws ´in abstracto´, so not in the context of a concrete case or controversy.
20 
Abstract review, if it exists at all, is exercised only by constitutional courts (in Austria, 
Germany,  Greece  and  Italy),  a  constitutional  council  (France)  or  Supreme  Court 
(Ireland). Concrete review takes place in the context of litigation and a specific case and 
can be exercised both by constitutional courts and by higher and lower ordinary courts.  
 
Carrubba  and  Murrah  hypothesize  two  effects:  1)  states  with  only  abstract  judicial 
review make less references than those without abstract review; 2) states with concrete 
judicial review make more references than those without concrete review.
21 We have 
problems with both hypotheses. The problem of the first hypothesis is that there is in 
fact only one EU15 country –France– that has only abstract review and no concrete 
review of the constitutionality of legislation. This is clearly not enough basis for a more 
general hypothesis. All other countries with abstract review also have some form of 
concrete  review.  Moreover,  given  that  the  preliminary  reference  procedure  always 
revolves around specific cases we do not see why having a tradition of abstract review 
or not would have an effect on the likelihood of sending references to Luxembourg.  
 
With  regard  to  the  second  hypothesis,  on  concrete  review,  we  think  it  is  useful  to 
distinguish further between countries where concrete judicial review is exercised by 
constitutional  courts,  countries  where  this  is  done by  ordinary  courts  (including  the 
Supreme Court in Ireland), and countries where concrete judicial review does not exist. 
From a point of view of judicial empowerment, the preliminary reference procedure 
clearly  offers  the  strongest  incentive  to  judges  in  countries  which  fall  in  the  latter 
category and we would therefore hypothesize that judges in states with no concrete 
review  make  relatively  many  references.  However,  from  the  same  judicial 
empowerment perspective we would expect the preliminary reference procedure to offer 
                                                 
19 Carrubba and Murrah 2005, p. 403-404.  
20 See Carrubba and Murrah 2005, p. 404. In contrast with their definition, abstract judicial can take place 
not just before (a priori), but also after (a posteriori) a law has been implemented.  
21 Carrubba and Murrah 2005, p. 404.   12 
a  greater  incentive  to  judges  in  countries  where  concrete  judicial  review  is  the 
prerogative  of  constitutional  courts  than  to  those  in  states  with  concrete  review  by 
ordinary courts. Constitutional courts may also serve as a catalyst for ordinary courts 
(particularly highest courts) to use the preliminary reference procedure when they are 
expected to. In Germany, for instance, the Constitutional Court has proved unwilling to 
make  references  itself,  but  it  also  considers  that  an  unmotivated  refusal  to  make  a 
reference by ´ordinary´ highest German courts infringes the constitution.  
 
Stone  Sweet  and  Brunell  dismiss  these  institutionalist  explanations  –without  a 
systematic test: ‘(…) it is obvious that distinctions between monist and dualist systems, 
and between those systems which permit or forbid judicial review, have no systematic 
effect that is measurable by our data.’
22 Carrubba and Murrah rightly point out there is 
no  reason  why  one  would  not  test  for  these  explanations,  given  that  there  are 
longstanding theoretical arguments supporting these institutionalist explanations (even 
if they may be hypothesized to work in different directions, as in the case of legal 
doctrine).
23  In  contrast  with  their  initial  expectations,  and  most  of  the  literature, 
however, Carrubba and Murrah find that for the two institutionalist explanations the 
assumed relationship is negative rather than positive: both monism and abstract judicial 
review  overall  lead  to  less,  rather  than  more  references.
24  We  come  back  to  these 
findings in the empirical part of our paper.  
 
Moving on to functionalist explanations, Stone Sweet and Brunell (p. 95) argue on the 
basis  of  their  transaction-based  theory  of  integration  that  the  importance  of  intra-
European trade for a country best predicts the number of preliminary references by 
courts in that country. They find statistical support for their hypothesis and conclude 
that ‘the evidence strongly suggests that the European legal order has been constructed 
as a self-sustaining, self-organizing system.’
25 Carrubba  and Murrah corroborate the 
hypothesis that member states with higher levels of transnational economic activity are 
                                                 
22 Stone Sweet and Brunell, p. 1998: 73.  
23 Carrubba and Murrah 2005, p. 416. 
24 Carrubba and Murrah 2005, p. 411. 
25 Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998, p. 95.   13 
more likely to make preliminary references to the ECJ.
26 Although we agree that the 
involvement  of  private  litigants  has  been  crucial  for  the  success  of  the  preliminary 
reference  procedure,  we  suggest  two  more  intuitive  factors:  population  size  and 
litigation  rates.  First,  bigger  member  states  will  make  more  references  than  small 
member states simply because there are more court cases as such and also more courts 
and judges than can refer questions. Second, some states are more litigious than others, 
due to legal culture, the availability of systems of alternative dispute resolution, or legal 
aid,  which  is  why  we  propose  the  introduction  of  a  relative  factor:  the  number  of 
litigious cases per capita.
27 In order to capture transnational activity we introduce a third 
variable which measures the ratio of intra-EU trade to GDP. Although population size is 
included as a control variable by Stone Sweet and Brunell,
28 the litigation hypothesis 




3. Method & Data 
 
In this paper we apply a mixed design of both quantitative and qualitative comparative 
methods to explain the variation in the use of the preliminary reference procedure by 
domestic courts. While the combination of quantitative analysis and case study analysis 
is seen fairly frequently in Europeanization studies,
29 the combination with comparative 
methods  such  as  Boolean  or  fuzzy-set  analysis  is  rare.
30  The  limited  use  of  these 
comparative methods is surprising given that they are developed for small to medium-
size datasets and seem well-suited for Europeanization studies.
31  
 
                                                 
26 Carrubba and Murrah 2005, p. 411. They also find that public support for integration and general 
political awareness among the population are significant predictors for a high number of references. In 
the latter case we are not convinced that there is a causal relation between the frequency of discussing 
political matters and the frequency of referrals to the ECJ and we exclude this factor from our analysis.  
27 See Alter 2000: 509.  
28 Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998. They find no significant effect of population size.  
29 See Börzel et al 2008; Mastenbroek 2007.  
30 See Kaeding 2007 for an exception.  
31 See Haverland 2007, p. 69.    14 
As a first step, we analyze the hypotheses by structuring our data as a cross-section  
data. We aim to capture the relative effect each of the predictor variables has on the 
degree to which preliminary references are issued. For this purpose we run an ordinary 
least square multivariate regression analysis and report the standardized coefficients.
32 
  
We follow up on this quantitative analysis with a Boolean analysis of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, based on the comparative method developed by Ragin.
33 Our aim 
here  is  to  look  for  specific  configurations  of  variables  (or  ‘conditions’  as  they  are 
termed by Ragin) that explain why some countries refer relatively many questions to the 
Court  in  Luxembourg,  and  others  relatively  few.  What  is  important  is  that  this 
comparative  method  is  explicitly  non-probabilistic,  which  means  that  rather  than 
searching  for  variables  that  ‘independently’  explain  a  part  of  the  variation  on  the 
dependent variable, Boolean analysis aims to detect necessary and sufficient conditions 
(or combinations of conditions) that lead to the presence or absence of the outcome. The 
example of monism may suffice. Carrubba and Murrah find that monism has a negative 
and significant effect on the dependent variable and conclude that ´disputes over the 
applicability  of  EU  law  arise  more  frequently  in  dualist  systems  than  in  monist 
systems.
34 However, when we look at the different countries in their study and their 
legal doctrine, we see that there are monist countries with relatively many preliminary 
references  (Belgium,  France  and  the  Netherlands)  and  also  dualist  countries  with 
relatively few references (Ireland and the Scandinavian countries). In other words: how 
strong is the empirical basis for the reversed legal doctrine hypothesis? By showing 
under which conditions statistical predictors ‘work’ and also under which conditions 
statistically insignificant variables actually may become relevant for explaining one or 
more cases, we use Boolean analysis to refine the outcome of our time series analysis.  
 
                                                 
32 However, the Durbin Watson statistics of this analysis indicate that there may be serial autocorrelation. 
To cross-check the validity of the standard errors, t and F values and the confidence intervals we ran a 
Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression to correct for serial autocorrelation. In this analysis we also find the same 
variables to be statistically significant as in the OLS analysis. 
33 See Ragin 1987; Rihoux and Ragin 2008. 
34 Carrubba and Murrah 2005, p. 412.    15 
A word on the data. In both analyses we use data for the fifteen countries that were 
member of the EU from 1995 to 2006.
35 For reasons of comparability we focus on the 
period from 1995 to 2006, where we have data for all fifteen countries over the twelve 
year period.
36 We exclude the ten states that joined the EU in 2004 because courts in 
only a few of these countries have referred only a few questions to the ECJ. This is 
generally in line with older members where domestic courts also needed a few years to 
adapt. Our dependent variable is the number of references per year per member state. 
These numbers are published at the CURIA website in the annual reports on the judicial 
activity of the Court of Justice.
37 For the multivariate analysis we use absolute numbers 
per  year,  for  the  qualitative  comparative  analysis  we  use  the  median  number  of 
references per year per member states over the period 1995-2006 (see Table 2).
38  
 
For population size we use Eurostat data on resident population per country per year.
39 
Although we prefer population size as a proxy for country size over GDP for theoretical 
reasons, as populous countries have more potential litigants and thus more opportunities 
to  refer  cases  to  the  ECJ  (all  other  things  being  equal),  it  should  be  noted  that 
statistically  this  choice  is  relatively  unimportant  given  the  high  correlation  between 
population size and GDP.  
 
For  litigation  rates  we  make  use  of  data  from  a  recent  study  on  European  judicial 
systems by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, of the Council of 
                                                 
35 Carrubba and Murrah use a dataset that has data up to mid-1998. An updated version of this dataset is 
available via the Legal Task Force at the NEWGOV website. See Stone Sweet and Brunell 2007.   
36 Carrubba and Murrah analyze the same fifteen countries, but their analysis covers the period from 1970 
to 1998. This means that they only have data for the first four membership years of Austria, Sweden and 
Finland, who acceded to the EU in 1995. Stone Sweet and Brunell exclude these three countries. 
37 Data refer to preliminary references based on Article 177 of the EC Treaty (now Article 234 EC), 
Article 35 (1) EU, Article 41 ECSC, Article 150 EA, 1971 Protocol. 
38 We reflected on using relative numbers in order to correct the dependent variable for population size, 
for example by calculating the number of references per 100.000 inhabitants, the disadvantage of that 
approach is that it greatly inflates the numbers for small countries, particularly Luxembourg. Instead we 
use population size as an independent variable in the time series analysis and as causal condition in the 
qualitative comparative analysis.  
39 Source for population: Eurostat database: Population and Social Conditions.   16 
Europe. Figures refer to the number of first instance civil and administrative litigious 
incoming cases, per 100.000 inhabitants in 2004.
40  
 
For intra-EU trade Stone Sweet and Brunell, as well as Carruba and Murrah, calculate 
the  total  volume  of  both  import  from  and  export  to  EU  countries.
41  One  important 
problem with this measure is that intra-EU trade correlates highly with both GDP and 
population size, which means, theoretically, that the measure for intra-EU trade as used 
by Stone Sweet and Brunell, as well as by Carrubba and Murrah, should be seen as a 
proxy for country size. Statistically, this means that is very difficult to maintain that 
intra-EU  trade  ‘widely  outperforms’  rival  variables  GDP  and population.
42  Intra-EU 
trade, GDP and population explain almost equally strong the variance in numbers of 
preliminary references. To solve this problem we introduce, next to population size, a 
new measure for the relative importance of European trade, which we calculate as the 
ratio of intra-EU trade divided by GDP.
43  
 
For the institutional variables we include one dummy variable for legal doctrine, which 
takes the value one if a state has a monist tradition and zero for a dualist tradition, and 
three dummy variables for the presence of different forms of judicial review.
44 For legal 
doctrine, we score countries as monist (MONI) when a clear doctrinal acceptance of the 
applicability  and  primacy  of  international  treaty  provisions  over  national  law 
enforceable in courts. According to our scores seven out of fifteen countries have a 
tradition of monism (see Table 2).  
 
                                                 
40  CEPEJ  2006,  p.  89.  See  also  CEPEJ  2008,  p.  132  for  an  overview  of  data  from  a  2006  survey. 
Unfortunately these more recent data only refer to litigious civil cases and cannot be compared to the 
2004 data, which also include data from administrative proceedings.   
41  Source  for  intra-EU  trade:  Eurostat  Statistical  Books:  External  and  intra-European  Union  trade 
Statistical yearbook. 
42 Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998, p. 75.  
43 Source for GDP: World Development Indicators. In contrast with CM we do not include GDP per 
capita in the analysis.  
44 Carruba and Murrah do not include the raw scores for these institutional variables in their paper. This 
means that it is not possible to check their scores with ours and hence to know whether our results may 
differ with theirs due to different scoring.   17 
For judicial review, we distinguish between abstract judicial review (ABJUDREV) and 
two  kinds  of  concrete  judicial  review.  For  concrete  judicial  review  we  differentiate 
between countries where this power is exercised by constitutional courts exclusively 
(CONJUDREV1), as in Germany, and countries where this is done by ordinary courts 
(CONJUDREV2), as in Scandinavian countries where we find a decentralized system of 
constitutional  review.  In  all  countries  except  France,  Netherlands  and  UK,  either 
constitutional courts or ordinary courts have concrete review powers, in other words the 
power to review the constitutionality of legislation in force in the context of a concrete 
case  brought  before  them.  However,  even  in  the  Netherlands  and  France  where  in 
principle  courts  do  not  have  the  power  to  annul  primary  legislation  that  violates 
constitutional law, they do have such powers in the light of international law based on 
their monist traditions. In the UK courts have a limited right of judicial review based on 
the Human Rights Act.
45  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
We measure net support for European integration, similar to Carrubba and Murrah, as 
the difference between the percentages of people that see EU membership as a ‘good 
thing’ and a ‘bad thing’ for their country.
46 Note that in occasional years, for Sweden 
and the UK, these calculations produce negative numbers when there are more people 
who see EU membership as a bad thing than there are people who see membership as a 
good  thing.  For  many  countries  the  numbers  fluctuate  significantly  and  the  range 
between low and high numbers can be quite large (>20), as in the case of Belgium 
where we see a decline of net support from 62 in 1995 to 24 in 1997, and a subsequent 
‘recovery’ to 67 in 2004.   
 
 
                                                 
45 This cannot lead to the courts declaring such law null and void or setting it aside: the higher courts can 
issue a declaration of incompatibility. Such declaration has no direct impact on the continuing validity of 
the law, but triggers a power that allows a Minister to make a remedial order to amend the legislation to 
bring it into line with the Convention rights. 
46 Source for net support: Standard Eurobarometers 43 (1995) – 66 (2006), Fall Surveys. See Carruba and 
Murrah 2005, p. 407.   18 
4. Analysis 
 
As outlined in the previous section we start with a quantitative analysis of a modified 
set of hypotheses derived from previous studies. Table 3 presents the results of cross-
sectional  data  with  OLS  regressions.  This  analysis  we  run  for  a  model  with  four 
functionalist and three institutionalist variables. The results of the model show that of 
the  predictor  variables  two  of  the  functionalist  variables  have  the  strongest  impact: 
population size and litigation rates. Both these variables are statistically significant and 
the  standardized  coefficient  is  positive.  This  means  the  larger  the  population  of  a 
country the more likely this country will have a high number of preliminary references. 
Also,  a  large  incidence  of  litigation  rates  tends  to  correlate  with  a  high  number  of 
preliminary references. The functionalist variable ´support for EU integration´ is also 
statistically significant, and has a positive effect. The other functionalist variable, intra-
EU trade to GDP ratios, is not statistically significant. 
 
Of  the  institutionalist  variables,  statistically  significant  are  the  following  two 
institutional variables: abstract judicial review and legal doctrine (monism). In line with 
the findings of Carrubba and Murrah, both coefficients are negative. This means that the 
presence of these institutional variables tend to lead to fewer preliminary references. 
When looking at the fit of the overall model we see that around sixty six  percent of 
variance between countries in terms of the number of annual preliminary references is 
explained by the independent variables.
47 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
Although the previous analysis is certainly useful, particularly in terms of determining 
the relative explanatory power of individual variables, it, however, may not give us the 
full picture. Perhaps the causal relationships of the phenomenon we are studying may 
not neatly adhere to a linear logic that regression analysis is geared to. For example, 
even though both population size and litigation rates clearly have strong explanatory 
                                                 
47 We also ran the model with lagged independent variables and did not find a significant improvement of 
the overall fit of the model. This perhaps may be due to the fact that there is not a lot of variation of the 
variables across time. The institutionalist measurements are invariant across time and the changes in the 
functionalist variables across the years are marginal (for instance population size or EU trade).   19 
power in general, neither all big countries (think of Spain) nor all countries with high 
litigation  rates  (think  of  Portugal)  have  high  reference  rates.  Also,  monism  may  in 
general have a negative effect, but we know that there are also monist countries with 
many  references  (Belgium,  France,  the  Netherlands)  and  dualist  countries  with  few 
references  (Ireland  and  the  Scandinavian  countries).  What  we  need  to  do,  after 
analyzing the relative strength of the different variables, is to specify the conditions 
under which these explanatory factors work. We do this, as explained above, on the 
basis of a Boolean analysis where all explanatory conditions as well as the outcome are 
dichotomized based on the threshold levels included in Table 2 (the four institutionalist 
conditions  are  already  dichotomized).  These  thresholds  are  generally  set  around  the 
median value, and thus dividing our population in half, but sometimes a ‘natural gap’ in 
the data may also lead us to place the threshold in such a way that the population is split 
well  below  or  above  the  median  value  (we  use  the  Thresholdsetter  function  in  the 
Tosmana program to detect these natural gaps in the data).  
 
On the basis of this dichotomized data matrix the software constructs truth tables where 
each line represents a logically possible combination of conditions. This means that a 
truth table with only two conditions will have four rows (2
2), with three conditions eight 
rows (2
3), etc. As our dataset consists of fifteen countries, and to avoid many empty 
truth table rows (combinations which are not represented by one or more empirical 
instances), we only use models with a maximum of four conditions, or sixteen logical 
combinations.  In  this paper  we  make  two  truth  tables:  one  of  the  four  functionalist 
variables and one of the four institutionalist variables. Note that these two analyses, in 
contrast with the time series analysis, cannot be used to test the relative explanatory 
strength of a model. Rather, these two qualitative comparative analyses are used to see 
how countries group within these two sets of causal conditions and how the different 
conditions may be logically ‘minimized’ to explain an outcome. By definition each of 
the truth tables will have at least one empty row, given that there are sixteen rows and 
only fifteen cases, and moreover some rows will be covered by more than one country. 
These empty rows are called ‘logical remainders’ and are represented by a white field in   20 
the truth table Visualizers. For reasons of space we only show the minimal formulae 
which result from minimization with inclusion of logical remainders.
48  
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
Figure 4 visualizes the truth table for a model with four causal conditions: support for 
integration, intra-EU trade ratio to GDP, litigation rates and population size. It shows 
that twelve of the sixteen logical combinations are represented by one or two countries 
and  that  there  are  five  logical  remainders.  The  horizontal  rectangle  in  the  centre 
represents countries with high litigation rates and the vertical rectangle represents large 
countries. The different marking (0 or 1) of each cell refers to the outcome: the darker 
cells are countries with low reference rates (e.g. DK, FI, SE, etc.) and the lighter ones 
are combinations with high references rates (e.g. DE, IT, etc.).  
 
When  minimizing  the  truth  table  for  the  four  functionalist  conditions  the  software 
produces the so-called minimal formulae stated above. Not surprising, the combination 
of high litigation rates with large population size (LITIGAT{1}*POP{1}) leads to a 
high number of references. What is more interesting is that we can now specify under 
which  conditions  countries  that  do  not  have  both  high  litigation  rates  and  a  large 
population may still make many references. In other words, how can we explain the 
outcome for Austria and Belgium (small country but high litigation rates) and France 
and UK (large countries but low litigation rates)? The minimization shows that support 
for integration is crucial in combination with population and countries  with a large 
population make relatively many references if there is relatively little support for the 
integration process. High intra-EU trade ratio is important in combination with high 
litigation rates. 
 
Figure 5 visualizes the truth table for a model with the four institutionalist conditions: 
monism, abstract judicial review, concrete judicial by constitutional courts, and concrete 
judicial review by ordinary courts. The four empty cells in the centre of the Figure 
indicate that there are no countries with concrete judicial review by both constitutional 
                                                 
48 When including logical remainders the software assumes an outcome for truth table rows which are not 
represented by empirical instances (see Rihoux and De Meur 2008 for a textbook explanation).    21 
courts and ordinary courts (which results from the judicial hierarchy in systems with 
constitutional courts). In fact, seven out of sixteen logical combinations do not exist 
within the group of the old fifteen member states.
49 
 
Minimization for the 1 outcome shows that all (three) countries where concrete judicial 
review permitted by neither constitutional courts nor ordinary courts have relatively 
high  reference  numbers (FR, NL,  UK).  Concrete  review  for  constitutional  courts  in 
combination  with  dualist  legal  systems  (AT,  DE,  IT)  also  leads  to  relatively  high 
reference numbers.  
 
[Figure 5 around here] 
 
When we minimize for the 0 outcome and as already indicated by all countries which 
fall in one of the cells of the vertical rectangle in the center of Figure 4, it appears that 
all  (five)  countries  that  have  concrete  judicial  review  by  ordinary  courts  have  low 
reference rates.
50 In other words, the presence of concrete judicial review by ordinary 






What explains the use of the preliminary reference procedure? In this paper we tested a 
number  of  explanations,  derived  from  the  literature,  and  found  that  first  of  the 
institutionalist variables abstract judicial review  and legal doctrine (monism) matter. 
Additionally, the functionalist variables, size, litigation rates and support for European 
integration matter. While others have pointed at the importance of intra-European trade 
we argue that this explanation has been operationalized in such a way that it becomes a 
proxy for country size and big states simply refer more questions than small states. We 
                                                 
49 One logical combination {1,1,1,0} produces a contradictory outcome (C) because Spain and Portugal 
are countries with relatively low reference rates, but Belgium has relatively number of references. 
50 The minimal formulae for the 0 and 1 outcomes differ because of empty truth table rows. 
51 The software also produces a minimal solution to cover Luxembourg, but because that minimization 
uses  a  logical  remainder  that  was  already  used  for  the  minimization  of  the  1  outcome  {0010},  this 
solution is left aside here. On contradictory simplifying assumptions, see Rihoux and De Meur (2008).    22 
also  found  that  high  litigation  rates,  as  a  proxy  for  strong  judicialization,  are  a 
significant predictor for high reference numbers. Having said that, these explanations 
cannot be seen as sufficient conditions for many  references: there are big countries 
(Spain)  and  countries  with  high  litigation  rates  (Portugal)  that  refer  well  below  the 
median  European  number  and  there  are  small  countries  (Austria  and  Belgium)  and 
countries with relatively low litigation rates (France, UK) that refer above the median. 
In order to explain these ‘outliers’ we show that it is useful to look beyond a linear 
regression  model  and  to think  in  terms  of  configurations  of  factors.  We  found  that 
population  size  only  explains  either  in  combination  with  high  litigation  rates  or  in 
combination with low net support for the integration process, and that high litigation 
rates only explain in combination with large population or in combination with high 
intra-EU trade to GDP ratios.  
 
We also looked at institutional variables related to legal doctrine and judicial review. 
We  found  that  countries  without  any  form  of  concrete  judicial  review,  and  dualist 
countries with concrete review by constitutional courts, relatively often refer questions 
to the Court in Luxembourg. All countries with concrete judicial review by ordinary 
courts have relatively low numbers of preliminary references.  
 
Of course, we acknowledge that other factors may also impact on the number of cases 
referred  or  not.  One  could  think  of  the  level  of  knowledge  of  European  law,  of 
practicing lawyers and advocates, and of judges, or the type of support the judges have 
with regard to research and documentation, and access to relevant materials. In some 
countries more than others, judges work under time pressure and have to meet targets, 
which they cannot meet if they ‘lose time’ making a reference.
52 Although clearly more 
difficult to operationalize for a systematic comparative study, these factors may also 
influence the number and type of questions referred, as well as their their quality. 
 
Finally,  having  these  findings  in  mind,  what  are  the  prospects  of  the  preliminary 
reference procedure in the near future? Ultimately, it is for the courts themselves to 
decide whether or not they make a reference and the success of the procedure thus 
depends on the willingness of the courts to make the reference, and on their compliance 
                                                 
52 See European Parliament 2007, for the results of a survey among more than 2300 national judges.    23 
with the ECJ judgments. In the past, the ECJ has always encouraged the national courts 
to  make  references,  and  has  been  extremely  lenient  in  admitting  them.  The  more 
references, the better, the message seemed to be. The Court has made it a policy not to 
review  the  opportunity  of  a  reference.  Today,  many  will  agree  that  the preliminary 
reference procedure is in crisis: too many references are made and it takes too long for 
the ECJ to give judgment (on average 22 months). The ECJ’s answer may also not be 
helpful  to  the  national  court  making  the  reference:  judgments  are  sometimes  very 
cryptic and difficult to interpret and there may be a difficulty for the national court to 
translate the European outcome of the reference and to fit it into national law. The 
system has come under pressure for many reasons: the extension of European law into 
ever wider fields, the complexity and sometimes poor quality of European legislation, 
increased  awareness  of  and  expertise  in  European  law  on  the  part  of  counsel  and 
national  courts.  It  may  be  expected  that  reference  rates  will  increase  further  as  a 
consequence of enlargement, and legal uncertainty following Treaty amendment. 
 
It seems fair to predict that the preliminary reference procedure will come under greater 
strain than it has over the past decades. The enlargement, the expansion of EU law to 
ever wider fields, and the impending extension by the Lisbon Treaty of the ordinary 
preliminary  reference procedure,  for  example  to  Title  IV  EC  on  asylum,  visas,  and 
migration, will lead to more questions being referred. It is with good reason that the 
debate  on  the  future  of  the  European  judicial  system  focuses  on  the  preliminary 
references  procedure  and  without  adjustment  the  system  may  well  collapse.  Many 
solutions  have  been  suggested,  some  of  which  already  possible  for  by  the  current 
treaties: the transfer of certain categories of questions to the CFI, for instance, or a green 
light  procedure,
53  procedural  reform  of  the  ECJ  to  enhance  capacity,  or  a  more 
restrictive  jurisprudential  approach  of  the  ECJ  curtailing  the  volume  of  preliminary 
rulings.
54 Some authors have gone further and have suggested limiting the competence 
to make references to only the highest courts within member states.
55 
 
Many of these proposals focus on the European Courts in Luxembourg. It has also been 
suggested, that the national courts should take their responsibility, and only make those 
                                                 
53 See Jacob 2004.  
54 See Lenaerts 2006.  
55 See Komarek 2006.    24 
references that are relevant for the Union as a whole. Self-restraint on the part of the 
national courts themselves could decrease the number of references and such restraint 
could be encouraged by the ECJ in its case law and a more restrictive version of the 
Notice for national courts. Yet, this is probably not the right time for such a measure: 
the courts in the new member states are still in the process of adapting to the procedure, 
and if Lisbon enters into force, both the ECJ and the national courts will enter a new 
era, where EU law enters in new fields, raising new questions for judicial settlement, 
such as in fields if fundamental rights, criminal law, and asylum. A clear balance will 
have to be struck between the need for a sufficient level of uniformity, efficiency of the 
courts, protection of European rights of individuals, enforcement of European law and 
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Appendix 1. Preliminary references, by EU-15 member state per year, 1995 - 2006 
 
                               
  AT  BE  DE  DK  EL  ES  FI  FR  IE  IT  LU  NL  PT  SE  UK 
1995  2  14  51  8  10  10  0  43  3  58  2  19  5  6  20 
1996  6  30  66  4  4  6  3  24  0  70  2  10  6  4  21 
1997  35  19  46  7  2  9  6  10  1  50  3  24  2  7  18 
1998  16  12  49  7  5  55  2  16  3  39  2  21  7  6  24 
1999  56  13  49  3  3  4  4  17  2  43  4  23  7  5  22 
2000  31  15  47  3  3  5  5  12  2  50  0  12  8  4  26 
2001  57  10  53  5  4  4  3  15  1  40  2  14  4  4  21 
2002  31  18  59  8  7  3  7  8  0  37  4  12  3  5  14 
2003  15  18  43  3  4  8  4  9  2  45  4  28  1  4  22 
2004  12  24  50  4  18  8  4  21  1  48  1  28  1  5  22 
2005  15  21  51  4  11  10  4  17  2  18  2  36  2  11  12 
2006  12  17  77  3  14  17  5  24  1  34  1  20  3  2  10 
                               
Source:  CURIA Annual Reports   28 
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Figure 2. Annual number of preliminary references in EU15 
(1995-2006) 














Source: CURIA   30 
Table 1. Overview literature on explaining variance in preliminary references 
 
Factors  Authors  Expectation  Finding 
 
institutionalist 
     















- concrete   
- abstract 

















     

















CM  Positive correlation  Positive correlation 
Population  SSB  No expectation  No correlation 
Litigation  A**  Positive correlation  No test 
GDP  SSB  No expectation  Positive correlation 
GDP / capita  CM  No expectation  No correlation 
Trade / GDP  CM  No expectation  No correlation 
 
Literature: Alter 1996 (A*); Alter 2000 (A**); Carrubba and Murrah 2005 (CM); Mattli 
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Table 3. Predictors of Preliminary References 
 
 
Standardized Coefficients  
(standard error) 
 
Population  .609*** 
(.000) 
Litigation Rates  .452*** 
(.000) 
Support for EU  .216*** 
(.000) 
Intra EU Trade  -.098 
(3.730) 
Monism  -.186*** 
(1.727) 
Abstract Review  -.239*** 
(2.050) 
Concrete Review  .059 
(1.939) 
   
Obs. 






* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
EUTRADGDP data missing for Luxembourg 1995-1998; values were imputed from 
1999.   33 
Figure 4. Truth table Visualizer: functionalist conditions 
 
 
Minimizing for outcome 1 
SUPINT{0}POP{1}  + EUTRADGDP{1}LITIGAT{1}  + LITIGAT{1}POP{1}   
(DE+FR,UK)    (AT+BE+NL)    (DE+IT+NL)   
 
Minimizing for outcome 0 
SUPINT{1}LITIGAT{0}  + EUTRADGDP{0}POP{0}   
(EL+ES+IE,LU)    (DK,FI,SE+EL+PT)   
   34 
Figure 5. Truth table Visualizer: institutionalist conditions 
 
Minimizing for outcome 1 
MONI{0}CONJUDREV1{1}  + CONJUDREV1{0}CONJUDREV2{0}   
(AT,DE,IT)    (FR+NL+UK)   
 
Minimizing or outcome 0  
CONJUDREV2{1}  
(DK,FI,SE+EL+IE)   
 
  
 